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This paper proves an equilibrium selection result for a class of games with strategic substi-
tutes. Speciﬁcally, for a general class of binary action, N-player games, we prove that each
such game has a unique equilibrium strategy proﬁle. Using a global game approach ﬁrst
introduced by Carlsson and van Damme (1993), recent selection results apply to games with
strategic complementarities. The present paper uses the same approach but removes the
assumption of perfect symmetry in the dominance region of the players’ payoﬀs. Instead
we assume that players are ordered such that asymmetric dominance regions overlapped
sequentially. This allow us to extend selection results to a class of games with strategic
substitutes.
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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
In general, game-theoretic models are developed under the assumption that the ra-
tional behavior of the players and the structure of the game are common knowledge.
Since these assumptions might be too stringent for modeling real-life players, it is
important to know whether the prediction of a game substantially changes in com-
parison to the predictions of a slightly altered version of the same game1. If indeed it
turns out that only certain of the game’s equilibria survive this “robustness check,”
then we may reasonably reﬁne our prediction of what happens in such games.
This paper examines the dual issues of equilibrium selection and robustness in
a class of games with strategic substitutes. These are games in which each player’s
marginal payoﬀ from increasing his own action is decreasing in the other players’
actions. The standard example is the game of voluntary contribution toward a public
good. The equilibria exhibit a classical free rider problem: an individual is less willing
to contribute the larger is the total contribution of others. If one’s contribution is
an indivisible choice such as a unit of time or eﬀort, then voluntary contribution
games typically exhibit multiple Nash equilibria, each corresponding to a distinct
conﬁguration of contributors and non-contributors.
To examine equilibrium selection in games such as these, we follow the Global
Games approach pioneered by Carlsson and van Damme (1993).2 The idea in this
approach is to examine Nash equilibria as a limit of equilibria of payoﬀ-perturbed
games. More formally, suppose G is a standard game of complete information where
the payoﬀs depend on a parameter x ∈ IR, and also suppose that for some subset of the
parameter x, G has a strict Nash equilibrium. Rather than observing the parameter
x, suppose instead that each player observes a private signal xi = x + σεi where
1Examples in this direction are the seminal contributions of Harsanyi’s games with randomly dis-
turbed payoﬀs (Harsanyi (1973)), and Selten’ concept of trembling hand perfection (Selten (1975)).
2For an excellent description and survey of the ensuing literature see Morris and Shin (2000).
2σ>0 is a scale factor and εi is a random variable with density φ.D e n o t e t h i s
“perturbed game” by G(σ),a n dl e tNE(G) and BNE(G(σ)) denote the sets of Nash
and Bayesian Nash equilibria of the unperturbed and perturbed games, respectively.
Equilibrium selection is obtained when limσ→0BNE(G(σ)) is a subset of NE(G).
Carlsson and van Damme (1993) show, in fact, that for two-player, two-action
games, this limit comprises a single equilibrium proﬁle. Moreover, this equilibrium
proﬁle is obtained through iterated deletion of strictly dominated strategies. Roughly,
the deletion requires that, for each player and for each action of that player, there are
certain extreme values of the parameter, x, for which that action is strictly dominant.
Even if these values carry very little probability weight, the players can use signals
close to these “dominance regions” to rule out certain types of behavior of others.
Hence, the iterative deletion proceeds.
Recently, these results have been extended by Frankel, Morris and Pauzner (2002)
for games with many players and many actions. However, existing results in this
literature are tipically limited to the case of strategic complementarities (and some
other technical assumptions). This strong result is very useful for many games such
as bank run models (Goldstein and Pauzner (2000)), currency crises games (Morris
a n dS h i n( 1 9 9 8 ) ) ,e t c .
Yet, there is a wide class of games where this condition is not satisﬁed. The
voluntary provision example mentioned above is but one example. Of course in the
two player case, the game can be represented as a game of strategic complements by
just reordering the set of actions. However, in games with more than two players ,
the analysis has not been extended to games of strategic substitutes.
The key insight in the present paper is to show how global games ideas can apply
to certain games of strategic substitutes when the players’ payoﬀsd i s p l a yac e r t a i n ,
commonly known asymmetry. Speciﬁcally for a class of binary actions games, we
assume that there exists an ordering of players such that each player’s dominance
3region is an arbitrary displacement to the right of the “previous” player’s dominance
region, i.e. the values of x at which some player’s upper dominance region begins
and at which his lower dominance region ﬁnishes are strictly higher (lower) compared
to those of any lower (higher) player. Under these assumptions and some other
technical properties, the main result of the paper proves that there exists a unique
equilibrium proﬁle. Speciﬁcally, we show that as the noise goes to zero, a process of
iterated elimination of conditionally dominated strategies converges to a single proﬁle
of switching strategies. I ns u c hap r o ﬁle, each player has a threshold, cutoﬀ signal
above which he takes the higher (contributing) action, and below which the lower
(non-contributing) action is taken. A very important characteristic of this proﬁle is
that each player has a diﬀerent cutoﬀ point. Interestingly, the order of these cutoﬀ
p o i n t si st h es a m eo r d e rt h a tt h ep l a y e r sh a v e . T h a ti s ,t h el o w e rt h ep l a y e ri n
the ordering, the smaller is his threshold. More precisely, the equilibrium predicts
that the ﬁrst player switches at the end of his lower dominance region, the last player
switches at the beginning of his upper dominance region and all the other players have
switching points in between these two. Intuitively, the equilibrium selected establishes
that, if there are certain number of players choosing the contributing action, it must
be the case that they are the lowest according to the players’ order, conditional on
the value of the parameter. Therefore, depending on the speciﬁcp a y o ﬀ structure of
the game, the equilibrium proﬁle structure might play an interesting role from an
eﬃciency point of view. The result suggests that common knowledge of the order of
players and global games structure are suﬃcient conditions to select not only a unique
but also an ordered equilibrium.
As an introductory example, in Section 2, we present a game of public good
provision, where all the assumptions are satisﬁed. The main result for this game
is that for general distributional properties of the signal noise, there exists a unique
strategy proﬁle played in equilibrium. This proﬁle induces an eﬃcient provision of the
4public good, and the contributions come from the lowest cost contributors. This result
suggests that ineﬃcient contribution equilibria survive only under a pair of stringent
assumptions: common knowledge of the fundamentals, and perfect symmetry in the
players’ characteristics. In section 3 we present this general framework and establish
our main result. In sections 4 we develop the main steps of the proof and ﬁnally, in
section 5 we presents the conclusions. Proofs of propositions and lemmas are relegated
to the appendix.
2 Example: Public Good Provision
In many collective action problems multiple Nash equilibria may exist, each corre-
sponding to a diﬀerent conﬁguration of contributors. Many of these equilibria are
ineﬃcient since individuals with a higher marginal cost of contributing end up con-
tributing disproportionately. Here, we prove a result that suggests that these ineﬃ-
cient Nash equilibria are not robust.
We develop a binary action game of incomplete information in which the mecha-
nism for public good provision utilizes both government and voluntary contributions.
In particular, to fund a public good, a government pledges “seed money” which must
be augmented by funds from private contributors. Each contributor, upon receiving
a private signal of the amount of this pledge, then chooses whether to contribute.
Agents have costs of contributing.
2.1 The Game
Consider the following N person game MN. A government (or a social planner) de-
cides to provide a public good G, requiring society’s contribution. The society is
composed by N diﬀerent individuals indexed by i =1 ,2...,N. Each agent has to
decide whether to contribute, choosing an indivisible action ai from the binary set
5Ai = {1=contribute, 0=not contribute}.





ernment contribution and n is the number of people who decide to contribute (not
considering the player i). Without loss of generality we can characterize the payoﬀs
as follows: if the agent i chooses to contribute, he has to provide an eﬀort (contribu-
tion) ci > 0, and receives a utility G(x,n +1 )− ci. On the other hand, if the same
agent chooses not to contribute (free ride), he will receive a utility G(x,n).L e tb e
∆G(x,n)=G(x,n+1)−ci−G(x,n) the player i’net payoﬀ from contributing. Finally,
the assumptions about the mechanism are the following:
(a.1) Strategic Substitutes. The greater the number of people contributing
the smaller is player i’s incentive to contribute.
∆G(x,n) < ∆G(x,n − 1)
Where G(x,n =0 )≥ 0.
(a.2) Continuity and Diﬀerentiability
∀nG (x,n) is a continuous and diﬀerentiable function of x.
(a.3) Monotonicity
∆G(x,n) is an increasing function of x. i.e.
∂∆G(x,n)





(a.4) Dominance Regions. Conditional on the value of the government con-
tribution: ∃ ki < X solving ∆G(x,N − 1) = 0, i.e. ∀x>ki action 1 is a strictly
dominant strategy, and ∃ ki >Xsolving ∆G(x,0) = 0, i.e. ∀x<ki action 0 is a
strictly dominant strategy.
Assumption (a.1) states the condition in the payoﬀ structure such that this game
is a game of strategic substitutes. In general, the greater the other players’ strategy
proﬁle, the smaller is player i’s incentive to increase his strategy. Assumption (a.2)
establishes a continuity and diﬀerentiability condition in the government contribu-
tion variable (the exogenous parameter), while (a.3) establishes that the higher the
6government’s contribution, the greater the player’s incentive to contribute. Finally,
assumption (a.4) requires that for a suﬃciently high (low ) values of the govern-
ment contribution, player i will always (never) contribute, i.e. (not) contributing is a
strictly dominant strategy.
2.2 Incomplete Information
Suppose now that the game is characterize by incomplete information in the payoﬀ
structure. Instead of observing the actual value of the government contribution x,
each player just observes a private signal xi, which contains diﬀuse information about
x. The signal has the following structure: xi = x+σεi, where σ>0 is a scale factor,




with uniform density and εi is an independent realization of
the density φ with support in [−1
2, 1
2]. We assume εi is i.i.d. across the individuals.
In this context of incomplete information, a Bayesian pure strategy for player
iis a function si :[ X − 1
2σ,X + 1
2σ] → Ai, and Si is the set that contain all such
strategies. A pure strategy proﬁle is a vector s =( s1,s 2,...sN),w h e r esi ∈ Si for all i
and equivalently deﬁne s−i =( s1,s 2,..si−1,s i+1,...sN) ∈ S−i.
Deﬁning this game of incomplete information as MN(σ), let us deﬁne BNE(MN(σ))
as the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria of MN(σ). For simplicity we will restrict the
analysis to the two player case, but the extension to the many players case is a direct
application from of our main result.
2.3 Two Player Case
We can represent the two player case in the following normal form:
7Player 2
Player 1
a2 =1 a2 =0
a1 =1 G(x,2) − c1,G (x,2) − c2 G(x,1) − c1,G (x,1)
a1 =0 G(x,1),G (x,1) − c2 G(x,0),G (x,0)
First suppose c1 = c2, the symmetric case. Then both players have the same
payoﬀ and dominance regions. In ﬁgure 1, we graphically describe the dominance
region structure of the game, where the cutoﬀ points are the same (i.e. k1 = k2 = k
and k1 = k2 = k).T h u s ,i f x>k (x<k )b o t hp l a y e r sa r ei nt h eu p p e r( l o w e r )
dominance region.
In the case of complete information about x, the set of Nash equilibria has the
following structure:
• For values of x in the dominance regions, both players choose the dominant
action. In ﬁgure 1 the dashed lines denote the value of x for which player 1 is
choosing a dominant action, and solid lines denote when player 2 is choosing
dominant actions. Therefore in each dominance region there exists a unique
action proﬁle in equilibrium: a =( a1 =1 ,a 2 =1 )in the upper region and
a =( a1 =0 ,a 2 =0 )in the lower region.




there are two pure strategy Nash equilibria,
where one player chooses to contribute and the other chooses not to contribute.
T h ef e a s i b l ep r o ﬁles played in equilibrium are either a =( a1 =1 ,a 2 =0 )or
a =( a1 =0 ,a 2 =1 )
This Nash equilibria structure suggests two important observations. First, the
Carlsson and van Damme equilibrium selection result can not be applied to this game
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Figure 1: Symmetric Case
because it requires that a selected equilibrium be a unique Nash equilibrium for some
subset of values of the exogenous parameter (x in this case). In this game, neither
the strategy proﬁle a =( 0 ,1) nor a =( 1 ,0) is a unique Nash equilibrium for some




this symmetric case not only implies multiplicity,
but also that each of the equilibria has an asymmetric structure where just one of
the players contributes. This suggests that it is likely that asymmetry will play an
important role in any equilibrium selection attempt.
Let us introduce asymmetry in the payoﬀ structure of the game. Suppose now
that c2 >c 1, and without loss of generality let us assume c1 = c and c2 =( 1+δ)c
where δ>0.
In ﬁgure 2 we can observe that the asymmetry generates the overlapping of the
dominance regions. A very important consequence of this fact is the generation of
as u b s e to fv a l u e so fx, (k1,k2) ∪ (k1,k2), where the proﬁle a =( 1 ,0)is the unique
equilibrium. This enable us to apply the Carlsson and van Damme result.
Deﬁne s∗ as a particular proﬁle of switching strategies, such that player 1 and
player 2 switches from action 0 to action 1 at the cutoﬀ points k1 and k2 respectively.
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Figure 2: Asymmetric Case
We can summarize the result in the following proposition:
Proposition. Consider a game M2(σ) satisfying assumptions (a1) to (a4).
There exists a unique strategy proﬁle s∗ that survives iterated deletion of the strictly
dominated strategies for a suﬃcient small amount of noise, so that ∃ σ>0, s.t.
∀σ ∈ (0,σ),B N E (M2(σ)) = {s∗}.
Figure 3 shows the structure of the equilibrium proﬁle s∗:p l a y e r1s w i t c h e sf r o m
not contributing to contributing at k1; and player 2 switches at k2. It is important to
notice that this strategy proﬁle induces an eﬃcient provision of the public good, and
that the contributions come from the lowest cost contributors. The result suggests
that ineﬃcient contribution equilibria survive only under a pair of stringent assump-
tions: common knowledge of the fundamentals, and perfect symmetry in the players’
characteristics.
Since the existence of overlapped dominance regions allowed us to select a partic-
ular equilibrium, it suggests that generalizing this payoﬀ structure, under the global
games approach, we can prove the existence of a unique equilibrium in a more general
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Figure 3: Equilibrium Selection: Two Players Case
class of games with strategic substitutes.
The next sections develop a more general framework, states and prove our main
result: the existence of a unique equilibrium proﬁle in certain class of global games
with strategic substitutes.
3 General Framework
Consider the following general setup for an N person game GN. There are N anony-
mous players indexed by i and each player has a binary set of actions Ai = {0,1}.3
Player i’p a y o ﬀ function is πi(ai,n,x) where ai ∈ Ai, n ∈ {0,...,N −1} is the number
of players (other than i) that are choosing action 1 and x is an exogenous variable
which takes values in the interval [X,X] ⊂ IR .
Finally let us deﬁne ∆πi(n,x)=πi(1,n,x) − πi(0,n,x) as agent i’s payoﬀ diﬀer-
ence when he is choosing action 1 rather than action 0. We consider the following
assumptions for the payoﬀ structure:
3We will also refer to ai =0as the “lower” action and ai =1as the “higher” action.
11(A1). Strategic Substitutes (SS). Conditional on the value of x,the greater
the other players’ strategy proﬁle, the smaller is player i’s incentive to choose the
higher action:
If n>n 0 ∆πi(n,x) < ∆πi(n0,x) ∀x.
(A2). Continuity (C)
πi(ai,n,x) is a continuous function of x.
(A3). Monotonicity (M). The greater the value of the exogenous variable x,
the greater the player i’s incentive to choose the higher action:
∃ c>0 s.t. if x, x0 ∈ [X,X]and x ≥ x0, then
∆πi(n,x) − ∆πi(n, x0) ≥ c(x − x0) ∀n.
(A4). Upper and Lower Indiﬀerence Signals (IS). If other players are
choosing identical actions, there exists a unique value of x such that player i is
indiﬀerent between the two actions:
∀i ∃ ki >X s.t. ∆πi(0,ki)=0and ∃ ki s.t. X>ki >k i s.t. ∆πi(N−1,ki)=0 .
(A5). Player Order (PO) Player j will be “greater” than player i,i ff o rb o t h
p l a y e r so b s e r v i n gt h es a m ev a l u eo fx and facing the same strategy proﬁle, player j
has less incentive to pick the higher action (i.e. gets a lower net payoﬀ):
There exists a players order {1,...,N} such that ∃ α>0 s.t if j>ithen
∆πi(n,x) − ∆πj(n,x) >α ∀i,j ∀n.
An important remark is that assumptions A1 (SS), A3 (M) and A4 (IS) provide
suﬃcient conditions for the existence of dominance regions, along which each action
is strictly dominant. This fact provides this setup with the necessary global game
structure, i.e. ∀x<k i ∆πi(n,x) < 0 and ∀x>ki ∆πi(n,x) > 0 ∀n.
Additionally, these assumptions allow us to state a more general single crossing
property, which will help to characterize the equilibrium proﬁle:
Lemma 1. There exists a unique e x ∈ [X,X] solving ∆πi(n,e x)=0 .
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Figure 4: Player i’s payoﬀs dependence on x
Therefore ∆πi(n,x) < 0 ∀x<e x and ∆πi(n,x) > 0 ∀x>e x ∀i ∀n.
In ﬁgure 4, we can observe how player i’s payoﬀsd e p e n do nx. F r o ml e m m a1w e
know that for all n there exists a unique e x such that player i is indiﬀerent between
the two actions, i.e. given n, player i’s best response is to switch from the lower action
to the higher action at a unique value of the signal. Given assumption A3 (M) we
can also conclude that the net payoﬀ function is monotonic in x and by assumption
A1 (SS) we know that for diﬀerent n the net payoﬀ functions do not intersect each
other.
Assumption A5 (PO) directly implies that if j>ithen kj >k i and kj > ki.4
In ﬁgure 5, for a three player case, we can observe a direct consequence of this
assumption: sequentially overlapped dominance regions. Therefore assumption A5
(PO) provides the necessary asymmetry in the game.
The last important remark about the assumptions is contained in the following
lemma:
Lemma 2. ∃ σ0 > 0 s.t.∀σ ∈ (0,σ 0), ∀j,i if j>iand xj − xi <σ ,
then ∆πi(n,xi) − ∆πj(n,xj) > 0 ∀n.
4Without loss of generality in the analysis we will assume the case where kN < k1, excluding the
trivial situations where kN > k1, i.e. player N’s lower dominance region does not overlap player
1’s upper dominance region.
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Figure 5: Overlapped Dominace Regions: Three Players Case
From assumption A5 (PO), we know that if two players face the same strategy
proﬁle and the same value of x, the “greater” player will get a lower net payoﬀ.T h i s
lemma states that this is still true even when they face diﬀerent values of x, such that
their diﬀerence is less than σ0.
3.1 Incomplete Information
S u p p o s en o wt h a tt h eg a m ei so n eo fi n c o m p l e t ei n f o r m a t i o ni nt h ep a y o ﬀ structure.
Instead of observing the actual value of x, each player just observes a private signal
xi, which contains diﬀuse information about x. We assume that this is a game of
private values, where each player gets utility directly from the signal rather than the
actual value of the variable.5
T h es i g n a lh a st h ef o l l o w i n gs t r u c t u r e : xi = x + σεi,w h e r eσ>0 is a scale
factor, x is drawn from the interval [X,X] with uniform density, and εi is a random
5Even though we have not proven that our main result is robust to this assumption, it is simple
to model the private value case as a limit of the common values case (when players derive utility
from the actual value of the variable) as the noise goes to zero (σ → 0). This approach has been
used in the global game literature. (Carlsson and van Damme (1993), Morris and Shin (2000) and
Frankel, Morris and Pauzner (2002).)
14variable distributed according to a continuous density φ with support in the interval
[−1
2, 1
2].We assume εi is i.i.d. across the individuals.
This general noise structure has been used in the global game literature, allowing
the conditional distribution of the opponents signal to be modelled in a simple way,
i.e. given a player’s own signal, the conditional distribution of an opponent’s signal xj
admits a continuous density fσ and a cdf Fσ with support in the interval [xi−σ,xi+σ].
Moreover this literature establishes a signiﬁcant result: when the prior is uniform,
players’ posterior beliefs about the diﬀerence between their own observation and other
players’ observations are the same,6 i.e. Fσ(xi | xj)=1− Fσ(xj | xi).
In this context of incomplete information, a Bayesian pure strategy for a player iis
af u n c t i o nsi :[ X − 1
2σ,X + 1
2σ] → Ai,i.e. conditional on receiving a signal xi player
i takes an action si(xi)=ai ∈ {0,1}. Ap u r e s t r a t e g y p r o ﬁle is denoted as s =
(s1,s 2,...sN) where si ∈ Si and equivalently we deﬁne s−i =( s1,s 2,..si−1,s i+1,...s N) ∈
S−i.





1 if xi >k i
0 if xi <k i
Abusing notation, we write si(·;ki) to denote the switching strategy with switching
threshold ki.
In this context of incomplete information, player i’s payoﬀ is characterized by
his beliefs about his opponents strategies. In general, if player i is observing a signal
xi and is facing a strategy s−i his expected net gain of choosing action 1 instead of
action 0 can be written as
6This property holds approximately when x is not distributed with uniform density but σ is





∆πi(s−i(x−i),x i)dFσ(−i)(x−i | xi)
Calling this game of incomplete information GN(σ), let us deﬁne BNE(GN(σ)) as
the set of Bayesian Nash equilibria of GN(σ). The main result of the paper will prove
that GN(σ) has a unique proﬁle played in equilibrium as σ goes to 0. In this proﬁle,
every player will play a switching strategy si(·;x∗






This states that, player i will switch from 0 to 1 at x∗
i,w h e r ex∗
i is the indiﬀerence
point, when he faces a strategy proﬁle such that all the players “lower” than him play
action 1 and all the “higher” players play action 0. From lemma 2 we know that for
all i, x∗
i not only exists, but it is also unique.
Let s∗ be the proﬁle such that each player is using a switching strategy si(·;x∗
i).
The main result of the paper is the following theorem:
Theorem.C o n s i d e r a g a m eGN(σ) satisfying assumptions (A1) to (A5), then
∃ σ>0 s.t. ∀σ ∈ (0,σ), BNE(GN(σ)) = {s∗}.
This proposition allows us to analyze a wide class of games of strategic substitutes
where multiplicity is a problem, extending the global game literature. In particular
this proposition generalizes the analysis and conclusion developed in the public good
example of section 2; now, lower cost players are represented by a “higher” position
in the players order (according to A5 (PO)), and they will switch between the actions
at a higher threshold.
As an example, in ﬁgure 6 we show a three players case. The strategy proﬁle in
equilibrium shows the higher player switching at the beginning of his upper dominance
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Figure 6: Equilibrium Selection: Three Players Case
region, x∗
3 = k3. The lower player switches at the end of his lower dominance region
x∗
1 = k1, and player 2 switches at x∗
2 where k1 <x ∗
2 <k3.
4 Proof of the Theorem
In this section we develop the main steps of the proof of the theorem. We will argue
that the proﬁle s∗ i st h eu n i q u ep r o ﬁle surviving a particular process of iterated dele-
tion of strictly dominates strategies. We start deﬁning the sequence of undominated
sets. Note however, that these are not the standard undominated sets used to deﬁne
iteratively undominated strategies. Instead these are sets deﬁn e db ya na l t e r n a t i v e
process that eliminates proﬁl e st h a ta r en o tp a r to fa n ye q u i l i b r i u m .T h e s es t r a t e g i e s
are strictly dominated when we restrict ourselves to considering some subset of others
players’ actions that are “potentially” part of some Nash equilibrium proﬁle. We call
these sets the conditionally iteratively undominated sets.7
We will prove that this process does not rule out any Bayesian Nash equilibria.
7Since the elimination proceeds upon players receiving the signal, then formally these sets contain
strategies that are interim strictly undominated.
17We then proceed to show that, under our mentioned assumptions the strategy proﬁle
surviving the iterated deletion is unique. Hence only one equilibrium survives. We
now describe the structure of the conditionally undominated sets in GN(σ) satisfying
assumption A1 to A5, and then proceed to give a formal proof of the theorem.
4.1 The Conditionally Undominated Proﬁles
For a given game GN(σ), let us deﬁne the process of deletion such that any strategy
proﬁle that survives t rounds of iterated elimination of conditionally strictly domi-










If player i’ best response correspondence is deﬁned as BRi(s−i)={si ∈ Si :
Πi(si,s −i,x i) ≥ Πi(s
0
i,s −i,x i) ∀xi ∀s
0
i ∈ Si}, then the conditionally undominated
sequence {St}∞
t=0 is deﬁned as follows:
Set S0
i ≡ Si and e S0





e s−i ∈ S
t
−i : ∃e si ∈ S
t−1








   










i,s −i,x i) ≥ Πi(si,s −i,x i) ∀xi ∀s−i ∈ e S
t−1
−i
and with strict inequality for somexi

   
   
(3)
This states that, e S
t−1
−i is the set of all others players’ strategy proﬁles that, for
some strategy si ∈ S
t−1
i , contains strategies that are mutually best responses (exclud-
ing player i). Recall from section 3.1, that Πi(ai,s −i,x i) represents player i’s expected
payoﬀ when, upon observing a signal xi and facing a strategy s−i, he chooses action
18ai. Therefore in each round, all the strategies that are strictly dominated when oppo-
nents actions are restricted to those that are “potentially” part of a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium proﬁle, are eliminated.
The following lemma establishes an important characteristic: For a general game
GN(σ) the conditional iterative process of elimination of strategies described above,
does not rule out any Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Lemma 3. St ⊇ BNE(GN(σ)) ∀t.
Additionally, the following lemma proves that if game a GN(σ) satisﬁes assump-
t i o n s( A 1 )t o( A 5 )a n d ,i ff o rs o m et, player N´s set of undominated strategies con-
tains a unique strategy such that he switches from action 0 to action 1 at kN ,t h e n
there exist a unique undominated proﬁle s∗ in St. The proﬁle s∗ is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium such that each component is a switching strategy where the cutoﬀ solves
equation 1. More formally:
Lemma 4. Consider a game GN(σ) satisfying assumptions (A1) to (A5). Suppose
∃ t such that St
N = {s∗
N}, then St = {s∗} and s∗ ∈ BNE(GN(σ)).
4.2 Iterated Elimination of Conditionally Dominated Strategies and Proof
of the theorem.
Now we describe the structure of the undominated set St for a game GN(σ) satisfying










{xi : ∆Πi(s−i,x i)=0 }
19Every element of the sequence represent the minimum signal among which the
player is indiﬀerent between the two actions, but now just considering all available
strategies of his opponent that belong to the set e S
t−1
−i , i.e. considering just the strategy
proﬁles that, for some strategy si ∈ S
t−1
i , contains strategies that are mutually best
responses (excluding player i). Since e S
t−1
−i ⊆ e St




Now, keeping in mind that x∗
i is the signal that solves equation 1 and describes
player i’ switching point in the proﬁle of switching strategies s∗, the following lemma
characterize the structure of every set St
i.
Lemma 5. Consider a game GN(σ) satisfying assumptions (A1) to (A5). Then




i = {si : si(xi)=0if xi < min{xt
i,x ∗








0 s.t. ∀ t ≥ t
0,x t
N = kN
The ﬁrst part of this lemma describe the structure of every strategy surviving
iterated deletion of conditionally dominated strategies. It shows that, giving xt
i, every
strategy in St
i plays action 0 for signals less than the minimum between xt
i,x ∗
i, and
plays action 1 for a signals in his upper dominance region and for signal in the interval
(x∗
i,x t




i. This lemma also establishes that




t=0 preserve players’ order.
The second part of the lemma state that player N’ sequence {xt
i}∞
t=0, reaches his
upper dominance region in a ﬁnite number of steps.
In ﬁgures 7 and 8 we illustrate the structure of the surviving strategies for the
20    1 k    
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Figure 7: Case xt
2 <x ∗
2
three player case. Figure 7 shows the case when xt
2 <x ∗




Having described and characterized the conditionally undominated sequence
{St}∞
t=0 for any game GN(σ), we next state the theorem again and develop the proof.
Theorem.C o n s i d e r a g a m eGN(σ) satisfying assumptions (A1) to (A5), then
∃ σ>0 s.t. ∀σ ∈ (0,σ), BNE(GN(σ)) = {s∗}.
Proof. From Lemma 6 it follows directly that ∃ σ>0 s.t. for all σ ∈ (0,σ) and
∀ t ≥ t
0 St
N = {s∗
N}. Therefore using Lemma 5 we can conclude that ∀ t ≥ t
0 St =
{s∗}. Finally from Lemma 4 we know that St ⊇ BNE(GN(σ)) then BNE(GN(σ)) =
{s∗}¥
5C o n c l u s i o n s
The global game approach is a proven method to incorporate more realistic assump-
tions in game-theoretic models. Assuming a very general payoﬀ structure, the ap-
proach examines Nash equilibria as a limit of equilibria of payoﬀ-perturbed games.
21    1 k                              
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Figure 8: Case xt
2 ≥ x∗
2
Carlsson and van Damme (1993) show that in binary action two-player games, there
exists a unique equilibrium proﬁle surviving iterated deletion of strictly dominated
strategies. Recently this result has been generalized by Frankel, Morris and Pauzner
(2002) to many players and actions, but limiting the analysis to games with strategic
complementarities.
Continuing with this line of research, we extend the literature proving an equilib-
rium selection result for a class of global games with strategic substitutes. Assuming
a particular asymmetry in the players’ dominance regions, we prove that for a general
class of binary action, N-player games, each such game has a unique equilibrium strat-
egy proﬁle. This result might allows us to analyze a wide class of games of strategic
substitutes such as collective action problems, entry-exit models in industrial orga-
nization etc. In particular we apply the result to a model of public good provision.
The interesting conclusion to this application is that the equilibrium proﬁle induces
an eﬃcient provision of the public good, and the contributions come from the lowest
cost contributors. In general the result provides a useful tool for applications.
Further research must be devoted to extend the result to games with more than
22two actions and with common values, i.e. where players derive utility from the actual
value of the exogenous parameter rather than the signal.
236 Appendix
To ease the exposition, we now repeat the formal statement of the proposition and
lemmas 1 to 5 before each of their proofs.
Proposition. Consider a game M2(σ) satisfying assumptions (a1) to (a4).
There exists a unique strategy proﬁle s∗ that survives iterated deletion of the strictly
dominated strategies for a suﬃcient small amount of noise, so that ∃ σ>0, s.t.
∀σ ∈ (0,σ),B N E (M2(σ)) = {s∗}.
Proof. Application of the theorem page 996, Carlsson and van Damme (1993).¥
Lemma 1. There exists a unique e x ∈ [X,X] solving ∆πi(n,e x)=0 .
Therefore ∆πi(n,x) < 0 ∀x<e x and ∆πi(n,x) > 0 ∀x>e x ∀i ∀n.
Proof .S i n c e ∆πi(·,x) is continuous and monotonic (assumption A2 (C) and
A3(M)), ∃! e xs . t .∆πi(n,e x)=0 and ∆πi(n,x) < 0 for all x< e x and ∆πi(n,x) >
0 for all x > e x. By assumption A4 we know that e x ∈ [X,X] for n =0and for
n = N − 1.Therefore by strategic substitutes (A1), e x ∈ [X,X] ∀n.¥
Lemma 2. ∃ σ0 > 0 s.t.∀σ ∈ (0,σ 0), ∀j,i if j>iand xj − xi <σ ,
then ∆πi(n,xi) − ∆πj(n,xj) > 0 ∀n.
Proof . From assumption A5 (PO) we know that there exists a players or-
der {1,...,N} such that ∃ α>0 s.t if j>ithen ∆πi(n,x) − ∆πj(n,x) >
α ∀i,j ∀n. Hence using assumption A3 (M) we know that ∀j 6= i if xi <x j ∃ σ0
ji > 0
s.t. ∆πi(n,xi)−∆πj(n,xi+σ0
ji)=0∀n. Let σ0 ≡ min{σ0
ji}j6=i therefore ∀σ ∈ (0,σ0)
if j>iand xj − xi <σthen ∆πi(n,xi) − ∆πj(n,xj) > 0 ∀n.¥
Lemma 3 St ⊇ BNE(GN(σ)) ∀t.
24Proof . By contradiction let us suppose that St ⊂ BNE(GN(σ)) for some t.
Then there exists a proﬁle s ∈ BNE(GN(σ)) and s/ ∈ St for some t.
Since s ∈ BNE(GN(σ)) implies
Πi(si(xi),s −i,x i) ≥ Πi(s
0
i(xi),s −i,x i) ∀xi ∀s
0
i ∈ Si and ∀i






i(xi),s −i,x i) > Π(si(xi),s −i,x i) for
some xi and for some s−i ∈ e S
t−1
−i . Therefore s is not a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
proﬁle. Hence it must be the case that St ⊇ BNE(GN(σ)) ∀t.¥
In order to develop proofs for lemmas 4 and 5 we ﬁrst need to introduce the notion
of reduced game and extremal proﬁles. We also state some of their properties.
Deﬁnition 1. Reduced Game: Consider a game GN(σ) as deﬁned in section 3,
and an arbitrary subset of players I.L e tsI =( si)i∈I and s−I =( si)i/ ∈I. Conditionally
on s−I, we deﬁne GI(σ,s−I) as a reduced game (with I players) of the original game
GN(σ).I t i s e a s y t o c h e c k t h a t i f GN(σ) satisﬁes assumptions A1 A2, A3, A5, the
same assumptions hold for the reduced game GI(σ,s−I). Additionally, if conditionally
on s−I there exists an interval of signal [λ,λ] ⊆ [X,X] such that for every player i
∈ I, there exist upper and lower dominance regions (according to assumption A4),
then GI(σ,s−I) is a reduced game that holds the same properties of the original game
GN(σ). These fact may allow us to use results from games with less players.




−i be the extremal proﬁles for some
player i. These two particular proﬁles are deﬁned as follows:
s
t−1











In words,8 by strategic substitutes (A1 (SS)) if player i, upon receiving a signal





independently of the value of xi.































Therefore, since by deﬁnition S
t−1
−i ⊇ e S
t−1
−i , by strategic substitutes the following




−i ,x i) ≥ ∆Πi(s
0t−1
−i ,x i) ≥ ∆Πi(s−i,x i) and
∆Πi(s−i,x i) ≥ ∆Πi(s
0t−1
−i ,x i) ≥ ∆Πi(s
t−1
−i ,x i).
Lemma 4. Consider a game GN(σ) satisfying assumptions (A1) to (A5). Suppose
∃ t such that St
N = {s∗
N}, then St = {s∗} and s∗ ∈ BNE(GN(σ)).





1 if xN > kN
0 if xN < kN
Then the subset of players {1...N −1} face a reduced game GN−1(σ,s∗
N).F o rt h e
subset of signal [X − σ,kN − σ] it is also easy to check that GN−1(σ,s∗
N) satisﬁes
assumption A1 to A5. From Lemma 5.A (stated at the end of this appendix), or ap-
26plying the Carlsson and van Damme result,9 we know that any game G2(σ) satisfying
assumptions A1 to A5 has the equilibrium structure according to equation 1. Then by
induction we can assume that GN−1(σ,s∗
N) has a unique equilibrium also according
equation 1. Therefore St = {s∗}.
Using the same argument, but starting from the right hand side, it easy to check
that the unique best response for player N to the proﬁle s∗
−N is to play s∗
N.¥
We prove next lemma 5. We will develop the proof using an induction argument in
the number of players, then in order to ease the exposition we ﬁrst present a version
of lemma 5 but for the two player case. We call this previous lemma, lemma 5.A.
Lemma 5.A. Consider a game G2(σ) satisfying assumptions A1 to A5. Then




1 = {s1 : s1(x1)=0if x1 <x 1 <k 1 and si(xi)=1if xi ∈ (k1,x t
1) ∪ (k1,X)}
St
2 = {s2 : s2(x2)=0if x2 <x t
2 and si(xi)= 1if x2 > k2}




0 s.t. ∀ t ≥ t
0,x t
2 = k2
Proof. Part i). First let us deﬁne σ ≡ min
©
(k2 − k1),(k2 − k1),σ0
ª
, where σ0 is
deﬁned according to Lemma 3. Now, from A1 (SS) if s1 is a best response (BR) to
a switching strategy s2(·;k2), it will be a BR to any s2 ∈ S0
2, then it is easy to check
that
∆Π1(s2(x2;k2),x 1 = k2 − σ)=∆π1(0,k2 − σ) > 0
∆Π1(s2(x2;k2),x 1 = k2 + σ)=∆π1(1,k2 + σ) < 0
9See theorem page 996, Carlsson and van Damme (1993)
27So, given continuity of the payoﬀ function we can use the intermediate value
theorem: ∃ x1
1 >k 1, where x1











Now, player 2’s ﬁrst round of elimination proceeds as follows: by A1 (SS), if
s2 ∈ S1





i (·;xi) to denote the “inverse” switching
strategy, which switches from 1 to 0 at xi, it will be a BR to any s1 ∈ S1
1. Then the








1),x 2 = k2)=∆π2(1,k2)Fσ(x
1
1 | k2)+∆π2(0,k2)(1 − Fσ(x
1
1 | k2))
From A4 (IS) ∆π2(0,k2)=0and from A1 (SS) ∆π2(1,k2) < 0. Since 0 <F σ(x1
1 |




Now, by A1 (SS) ∆Π2(s
−
1 (·;x1
1),x 2 = x1
1 + σ)=∆π2(0,x 2) > 0. Again, given
continuity of the payoﬀ function we can use the intermediate value theorem: ∃ x1
2
>k 2, where x1














2 : s2(x2)=0if x2 <x
1
2 and s2(x2)=1if x2 > k2
ª
Repeating this process of iteration it is easy to prove by induction that a strategy
proﬁle s surviving t rounds of elimination is contained in the set St such that:
St
1 : {s1 : s1(x1)=0if x1 <k 1 and s1(x1)=1if x1 ∈ (k1,x t
1) ∪ (k1,X)}
St
2 : {s2 : s2(x2)=0if x2 <x t
2 and s2(x2)=1if x2 > k2}




2 are obtained recursively from the following equations
x
t
























Part ii). Now, let us suppose now that there exist the limit point x∞
1 and by
construction there also exists x∞
2 where 0 ≤ x∞
2 − x∞
1 <σ .Rewriting the conditions































2 )) = 0 (6)













1 ) − ∆π2(0,x
∞




2 )) = 0
but from lemma 3 and since 0 <F σ(x∞
1 | x∞
2 ) < 1 we know that each term
in equation 7 is strictly positive, then ∆Π1(s2(·;x∞
2 ),x ∞
1 ) − ∆Π2(s
−
1 (·;x1),x ∞
2 ) > 0.
Contradiction. Hence, since {xt
1} is an increasing unbounded sequence it must be the
case that ∃ t∗ s.t. ∀t>t ∗ xt
1 ≥ k1. i.e. in a ﬁnite number of steps the sequence
reaches the upper dominance region eliminating all strategies but one: s1(·;k1). On
29the other hand xt∗





2 = k2 i st h el a s te x p e c t e dp a y o ﬀ w h e r eh ei si n d i ﬀerent between




Lemma 5. Consider a game GN(σ) satisfying assumptions (A1) to (A5). Then




i = {si : si(xi)=0if xi < min{xt
i,x ∗








0 s.t. ∀ t ≥ t
0,x t
N = kN






, where σ0 is cal-
culated according to Lemma 2. Second, since we need to prove that both parts of
t h el e m m aa r et r u ef o ra l li and for all t, let us introduce an induction argument in
the number of players. Lemma 5.A shows that Lemma 5 is true for games with two
players G2(σ) satisfying assumptions A1 to A5. Therefore let us assume that lemma
5 remain valid for games with N − 1 players satisfying assumptions A1 to A5.
Now, having assumed the inductive process in the number of players, we will prove
the ﬁr s tp a r to fL e m m a5t h r o u g hi n d u c t i o ni nt and we will prove the second part
showing that GN(σ) is “composed” of two reduced games.
P r o o fo fp a r ti). First consider the ﬁrst round of conditional elimination, t =
1. By deﬁnition of σ, we know that kN−1 <k N,−σ then,11 ∀i =1 ,..N − 1 and
∀xi <k N − σ player i’s payoﬀ is ∆Πi(s−{i,N},s N =0 ) .Then, the subset of players
{1...N −1} face a reduced game GN−1(σ,sN =0 ) . It is easy to check that for signals
11Recall that kN−1 > ... > k1
30in the subset [X −σ,kN −σ], t h er e d u c eg a m eGN−1(σ,sN =0 )satisﬁes assumptions
A1 to A5. By the induction assumption we know that Lemma 5 holds for games with
N −1 players, then for players 1 to N −1 the ﬁrst round of elimination coincide with
the one in the reduced game. More formally: for every player in GN−1(σ,sN =0 )there
exist b x
1
i and b Si, hence x1
i = b x
1
i and S1
i = b S1
i . Now, since x1
N−1 <k N − σ, then the
minimum signal for which player N is indiﬀerent between the two actions is kN, i.e.
x1
N = kN. Therefore the undominated set S1
N contain all strategies that plays the
dominant action in the corresponding dominant region, i.e. S1
N = {sN : sN(xN)=
0 if xN <x 1
N and 1 if xN > kN}.
Now, following the induction argument in t, we assume that lemma 5 is true for a









and let us show that the lemma is true in both cases.
a) First, without loss of generality let assume that some player l ∈ {1,...,N −1} is
the “last” player to reach his threshold x∗
l. Therefore the induction assumption can




i = {si : si(xi)=0if xi <x ∗
i and 1 if xi ∈ (x∗
i,x
t−1
i ) ∪ (ki,X)}
∀i =( l +1 ) ,...,N
S
t−1
i = {si : si(xi)=0if xi <x
t−1
i and 1 if xi > ki},





Now it is enough to prove that St has the same structure as St−1, i.e players
i =( l +1 ) ,...,N − 1 will increment the set of signals where they pick action 0 and
players i =1 ,...,l will increment the set of signals where they pick action 1.
By strategic substitutes, for all i =( l+1),...,N −1 the component of the extreme
31proﬁle s
t−1
−i , associated with the Nth player is sN(·;kN). Then if player i, upon
receiving a signal xi and assuming that his opponents are using the strategy proﬁle
s
t−1
−i , chooses action 0 he will choose action 0for all s−i ∈ e S
t−1
−i .
Recall that if players i =1 ,...,l choose action 1 when other players’ strategy is
s
0t−1
−i , they will pick action 1 for all s−1 ∈ e St
−i. We now prove that ∀i ∈ {1,...,l}
and ∀xi <x ∗
N−1, the component, of the extreme proﬁle s
0t−1
−i , associated with the
Nth player is sN(·;kN) as well. Suppose by way of contradiction that the strategy
is diﬀerent from SN(·;kN)) for some xi <x ∗
N−1. Then ∃ a neighborhood O ⊆ [xi −
σ,xi+σ] such that on Os N(xN)=1 . Since for signals less than x∗
N−1 we cannot have
the N − 1 dimensional proﬁle (1,...,1) on O. By anonymity permute player N with
some player js
0t−1
j (xj)=0 , then by strategic substitutes this permuted strategies
lower payoﬀ ∆Πi, and so s
0t−1
−i could not have been a minimizer of ∆Πi on e S
t−1
−i .
Now, we conclude that, for all signal less than x∗
N−1 the extremal proﬁles s
t−1
−i ∀i ∈
{(l +1 ) ,...,N − 1}and s
0t−1
−i ∀i ∈ {1,...,l} coincide at least in their last component;
both proﬁles consider player N playing the switching strategy sN(·;kN). Then the
subset of players {1...,N − 1} face a reduced game GN−1(σ,sN =0 ) .I t i s e a s y t o
check that for the subset of signal [X − σ,x∗
N−1], the reduced game GN−1(σ,sN =0 )
satisﬁes assumptions A1 to A5. By the induction assumption we know that Lemma
5 holds for games with N − 1 players, then for players 1 to N − 1 the round of
elimination t coincides with the same round of the reduced game. More formally: for
every player in GN−1(σ,sN =0 )there exist b x
t
i and b St
i, hence xt
i = b x
t
i and St
i = b St
i, i.e.
St
i have the same structure than S
t−1
i for all i ∈ {1,...,N − 1}.
By assumption A5 (Players Order) and using the intermediate value theorem it is
easy to check that there exists xt
N >x t





N = {sN : sN(xN)=0if xN <x t
N and sN(xN)=1if xN > kN}
b) In this second case we assume that x
t−1
N−1 ≥ x∗
N−1. We will follow the same
32argument described and used in the previous part. Now, since we are considering
signals such that x
t−1
N−1 ≥ x∗
N−1 we know that players 1 to N − 1 have reached his
threshold . By strategic substitutes, for all i = i =2 ,...,N − 1 the component, of
the extreme proﬁle s
t−1
−i , associated with the ﬁrst player is s1(·;k1). Then if player
i, upon receiving a signal xi and assuming that his opponents are using the strategy
proﬁle s
t−1
−i , chooses action 1 he will choose action 1for all s−i ∈ e S
t−1
−i .
O nt h eh a n dw en e e dt op r o v et h a tp l a y e rN will increment the set of signal where
he picks action 0, then if this player chooses action 0 when other players’ strategy is
s
0t−1
−N , they will pick action 0 for all s−1 ∈ e St
−i. We now prove that the component, of
the extreme proﬁle s
0t−1
−N , associated with the ﬁrst player is s1(·;k1) as well. Suppose
by way of contradiction that the strategy is diﬀerent from s1(·;k1) for some xi ≥
x∗
N−1. Then ∃ a neighborhood O ⊆ [xi − σ,xi + σ] such that on Os 1(x1)=0 . Since
for signals greater or equal than x∗
N−1 we cannot have the N − 1 dimensional proﬁle
(0,...,0) on O. By anonymity permute player 1 with some player js
0t−1
j (xj)=1 , then
by strategic substitutes this permuted strategies higher payoﬀ ∆Πi, and so s
0t−1
−i could
not have been a maximizer of ∆Πi on e S
t−1
−i .




−i ∀i ∈ {2,...,N − 1}and s
0t−1
−N coincide at least in their ﬁrst component;
both proﬁles consider player 1 playing the switching strategy s1(·;k1). Then the subset
of players {2...,N} face a reduced game GN−1(σ,s1 =0 ) . It easy to check that for the
subset of signal [x∗
N−1,X+σ,] the reduced game GN−1(σ,s1 =0 )satisﬁes assumptions
A1 to A5. By the induction assumption we know that Lemma 5 holds for games with
N − 1 players, then for players 2 to N the round of elimination t coincides with the
same round of the reduced game. More formally: for every player in GN−1(σ,s1 =
0) there exist b x
t
i and b St
i, hence xt
i = b x
t
i and St
i = b St
i, i.e. St
i have the same structure
than S
t−1
i for all i ∈ {2,...,N}.
By assumption A5 (Players Order) and using the intermediate value theorem it
33is easy to check that there exist xt
1 <x t





1 = {s1 : s1(x1)=0if x1 <k 1 and s1(x1)=1if x1 ∈ (k1,x t
1) ∪ (k1,X + σ)}.
P r o o fo fp a r tii) By the induction argument we know that in both reduced games,
GN−1(σ,sN =0 )and GN−1(σ,s1 =0 )described above, the higher player completes
the elimination of conditionally dominated strategies in a ﬁnite number of steps.
Since we treated game GN(σ) as it were “composed” of two reduced games, player
N in GN(σ) also completes the deletion process in a ﬁnite number of steps, i.e.
∃ t0 s.t. ∀ t ≥ t0,x t
N = kN.¥
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